Introduction
Debit cards have surpassed credit cards to become the most common form of Visa pointof-sale ("POS") transaction (Visa 2002) . Overall, debit cards were used for over 15.5 billion POS transactions totaling $700 billion in the year 2002 (CPSS 2003) .
1 This represented about 35% of electronic payment transaction volume and 12% of POS noncash payments.
2 Debit's ascension has been sudden; in 1995, debit comprised only 2% of retail noncash payments (Gerdes and Walton 2002) . Industry observers predict continued strong growth for debit, while forecasting relatively weak growth in credit card charge volume.
3 Despite debit's growth and prominence, the determinants of debit card use have largely escaped academic scrutiny. 4 Meanwhile, many commentators, drawing on market research, assert that debit cards serve as a form of commitment device against the type of "overborrowing" with credit cards posited by Ausubel (1991) or Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) . 5 And indeed, certain raw data suggest that one or more "behavioral" explanations drive debit use. Debit cards tend to be used for smaller transactions involving instantaneous consumption, with credit cards used to purchase larger, more durable items (Reda 2003 )-a pattern consistent with the mental accounting model in Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) . Yet neither behavioral nor more traditional explanations for debit use have been put to the test. 6 This paper tests the ability of a standard consumer choice model to explain debit card use by focusing on consumer sensitivity to the (implicit) relative price of electronic payments at the POS. The lack of consumer-level data on explicit transaction fees is not much of a constraint, as I show that the dominant determinant of relative payments price at the POS is often whether the consumer has been revolving balances on her credit card--and hence must "borrow-to-charge". By boiling down the POS payment choice to one between debit and credit, one thus can test whether the consumer jointly optimizes over her payment options using widely available data. Specifically, a standard model of consumer choice generates the following testable predictions: 1. consumers who revolve credit card balances ("revolvers") should be more likely to use debit than those who don't ("nonrevolvers"); 2. revolvers facing binding credit constraints should be discretely more likely to use debit than revolvers who don't; 3. bankcard holders should be less likely to use debit than those without bankcards, conditional on revolving status (since they should exploit the free float).
I find statistically and economically significant support for each of these predictions (especially the first two); overall, the results cast doubt on the need to invoke behavioral explanations to explain debit card use. This has implications for understanding highfrequency intertemporal choice generally. In particular, the lack of an obvious "payments puzzle" stands in apparent contrast to other aspects of consumer financial behavior that have proven difficult to explain with straightforward applications of canonical models. 7 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the consumer choice problem at the POS. I describe how debit and credit offer essentially identical advantages relative to alternative payments media, and how they enjoy virtually identical acceptance. It is therefore straightforward to boil down the POS payments choice to one between debit and credit. In comparing debit to credit, then, it is easy to show that while credit offers free float to non-revolvers, and superior fraud protection and reward incentives during the sample period, debit is a relatively cheap alternative for certain consumers. Specifically, standard consumer choice theory generates tight predictions on who consumers should be more likely to use debit-those who revolve credit card balances, those who face binding bankcard credit limits, and those who lack a bankcard. Section 3 describes the data and empirical model used to test these predictions. The Survey of Consumer Finances' information on credit and debit use, combined with its rich detail on household characteristics, financial attitudes, and elements of credit and transactions demand, make it well-suited to test the theory and explore threats to identification.
Section 4 briefly considers some descriptive statistics that further motivate studying debit use as a consumer choice problem. In the raw, the Surveys of Consumer Finances and December 1996 Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior appear to suggest that 34% of users employ debit despite the absence of any obvious cost advantage; not surprisingly, however, endogeneity and measurement concerns motivate econometric approaches.
Section 5 presents the core results. The findings support the standard model's key predictions. Revolvers do appear to be about 6 percentage points more likely to use debit than non-revolvers, and there is a discrete additional effect for consumers with plausibly binding credit limits. These results are robust to controls for credit and payments demand, supply, and related tastes; i.e., conditional on exogenous household demographics, adding additional proxies for transacting and borrowing motives, for access to debit and credit, and for secular tastes that might effect payments choice do not change the results meaningfully. The findings are also consistent with the prediction that bankcard holders should take the free float where possible, and therefore be less likely to use debit, but this result generally lacks statistical significance.
Section 6 refines the point estimates and their interpretation as a test of the canonical consumer choice model. It shows that several types of data limitations (including the lack of SCF data on cash back, rewards programs, and individual bankcard balances) imply that the observed price sensitivity of debit use is a lower bound of the true one, and almost certainly a conservative lower bound at that. The results thus cast doubt on the need to appeal to behavioral theories in explaining the rise of debit use; rather, consumer price sensitivity in the face of steady debit supply increases could well be sufficient.
Section 7 concludes by briefly discussing the findings' implications for the study of electronic payment adoption and consumer choice more generally.
Consumer Choice at the Point-of-Sale
This section details the consumer choice problem at the POS. I describe how debit and credit offer essentially identical advantages relative to alternative payments media, and how they enjoy virtually identical acceptance. Therefore it proves straightforward to boil down the POS payments choice to one between debit and credit. Turning to the choice between debit and credit, it is shown that while credit offers free float to non-revolvers, and superior fraud protection and reward incentives during the sample period, debit is a relatively cheap alternative for certain consumers. Specifically, standard consumer choice theory generates tight predictions on which consumers should be more likely to use debit-those who revolve credit card balances, those who face binding bankcard credit limits, and those who lack a bankcard.
Debit card payment mechanics
There are two types of debit card transactions, "online" and "offline".
8 Online transactions are processed using a POS terminal and personal identification number (PIN), and involve some real-time verification of the cardholder's available funds. Offline transactions are signature-based, and are processed much like traditional credit card transactions, with no immediate attempt to verify funds availability. 9 In either case payments are deducted "directly" from the cardholder's checking account; in practice this takes 0-3 days, with online transactions typically settling more quickly.
Payments choice
Traditionally, the literature on media of exchange have focused on acceptance, security, portability, time costs, and pecuniary costs as the key elements of payments choice (Jevons 1918) . I begin by briefly comparing debit, credit, and alternative payments media along each of the first four dimensions, and then develop a simple model of consumer choice between debit and credit based on pecuniary costs.
Acceptance: Debit and credit enjoy similarly widespread acceptance as a payments device; indeed, Shy and Tarkka (2002) treat them as equivalent. Rough equivalence has come about due to the rise of "offline" debit, whereby an ATM card with a Visa or Mastercard mark can be used, as a debit card, anywhere the credit card brand is accepted. In essence then, one can use debit wherever one can use credit (with a few exceptions, including online purchases, car rentals, etc.) 10 Consequently debit and credit are essentially equivalent along this margin when compared to cash or check.
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Security: Debit and credit now offer essentially identical fraud protection (this is a relatively recent advent and is discussed further in Section 6), and hence offer similar protection against theft compared to cash or check.
Portability: Obviously, debit and credit are plastic card-based media, offering identical advantages over bulkier cash and checkbooks.
Time costs: Debit and credit transactions are typically processed exactly the same way, using either a POS terminal or signature-based transactions. These methods may be more or less time-consuming than cash or check, depending on the situation. Debit does offer the additional advantage of "cash back" in some cases, but empirically this is not a dominant feature of debit use, and I postpone detailed consideration of this feature until Section 6.
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Clearly, debit and credit offer very similar attributes along the acceptance, security, portability, and time cost margins. Presume then for a moment that transaction demand is exogenous, and that an optimizing consumer holding one bank credit card, when confronted with a POS transaction, chooses her payment medium in two steps by: 1. Deciding whether to use "paper" (cash, check) or "plastic" (debit, credit), based on the four margins discussed above. 2. Minimizing pecuniary costs, conditional on the choice in step 1.
Then in the case where the consumer is using plastic, she faces the following problem:
C d and C c and represent the marginal (implicit) pecuniary cost of using debit and credit, respectively. The direct cost of C d debit depends on p, the amount of the transaction fee 10 Imperfect substitutability between debit and credit on the acceptance margin will generate bias in favor of the null hypotheses developed below. See Section 6 for discussion. 11 For simplicity, I ignore "smart" or prepaid cards (only 3% of US households used them regularly in 2001), and Automatic Clearing House payments ("autodebits", which tend to be used for recurring bill payments and not at the POS). 12 About 17% of debit transactions involve cash back (Breitkopf 2003) , and only about 29% of regular debit users ever get cash back (December 1996 Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior). Note also that cash back is only available in the 25% of merchant locations where there are the POS terminals required for online (PIN-based) debit (Breitkopf 2003) . See also Section 4. that is sometimes levied.
13 During the sample period under consideration in this paper only about 15% of debit cardholders faced transaction fees (Marlin 2003) , and the modal nonzero fee was 25 cents (Consulting 2001) . Most fees were and are charged on online debit transactions only; charges per offline or credit card transaction have been very rare in the United States.
The cost C c of using credit depends first on H, whether the household has a bankcard. Assume for simplicity that households lacking a bankcard (H=0) do so only for supply reasons 14 (alternative explanations are considered in Section 5). Then C c as infinite for these households.
C c also depends on f, the "rewards" benefits available per unit charged. These typically have been more prevalent and generous for credit than debit, and can be valued at approximately one cent per dollar charged for the 50% or so of cardholders earning rewards. (More too on this in Section 6.) C c depends finally on r, the effective interest rate at which the consumer must borrow (or float) to charge at the point of sale. r in turn is determined by R, a discrete variable capturing whether the consumer "revolved" a balance at her last credit card payment due date (assume for the moment that the consumer holds only one credit card; I consider the complication of multiple cards below). In cases where R =1, i.e., where the consumer did not pay her balance in full, then she must borrow-to-charge-each dollar charged on the margin begins accruing interest immediately at the consumer's "purchases" rate, r purch . In contrast, when R = 0 the consumer typically enjoys the free float of a zero-interest loan for up to 60 days, so r<0. 15 Consequently, the stakes of making the "correct" payments choice at the POS, conditional on R, can be substantial: a revolver with nonzero but nonincreasing demand for credit card debt, who used her credit card to borrow-to-charge rather than using debit and made credit card payments only once per month, would spend about $12 more per month to charge an amount equal to one-half of one month's median income ($2,000) at the median rate revolvers face (14.5% APR).
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13 For the purposes of discussion I assume that the effective interest rate on debit transactions is zero, ignoring settlement lags (which can provide a day or two of free float) and costly checking account overdrafts (Fusaro 2003) . 14 This seems plausible in a standard consumer choice framework, since holding a bankcard is essentially costless in the pecuniary sense, given the prevalence of no-fee cards and strong fraud protection. 15 For example, say I paid my MBNA balance in full on September 10 th (a payment due date, typically one month after a statement closing date). Then my MBNA balance netting charges and credits during the period from September 11 st to October 10 th must be paid in full on or before November 10 th in order for me obtain free float on purchases made between November 11 th and December 10 th . 16 This assumes no debit transaction fees (see below). Thus far we have considered an optimizing consumer facing a marginal decision. This begs the question, however, of why, if the revolving consumer does not wish to borrow more on the margin and is capable (in a cash flow sense) of using money from her checking account (via a debit transaction) to settle marginal transactions over time, does she not: a) simply pay down any credit card balance in advance (say immediately after getting paid), and then b) use her credit card to transact until the next pay date. One possibility is that the foregone arbitrage is relatively small. Consider a worker who is paid every two weeks and carries the median bankcard balance ($1,800) at the median interest rate (14.5% APR) for SCF revolving households. Even under the extreme assumptions that the household has sufficient cash flow to pay off the entire balance upon salary receipt, and that the credit card is a perfect substitute for checking account balances as a payments device, foregone arbitrage for the two-r also depends discretely on whether B, the amount outstanding on the credit line L, exceeds L. When B>L typically three adverse things happen to the consumer: i) the rate on the outstanding balance increases substantially, i.e., r over >>r purch ; ii) an overlimit fee ranging from $20-$30 is incurred, and iii) her credit rating worsens.
17 r may also vary smoothly with B and L, depending on the option value of borrowing (more on this in Section 5).
The key insights from framing the choice problem in this way are straightforward: we find that debit card use is relatively attractive to households lacking a credit card, revolving a credit card balance, or facing a binding credit card limit constraint, because each of these conditions raises the marginal cost of using credit relative to debit. This suggests the following empirical test:
Where i indexes consumers, Y is a measure of debit use, H and R are defined above, F is a 1/0 measure of whether the household faces a binding credit card limit constraint, and X includes several variables that can be used to help identify the model by capturing other payments costs, payments and credit demand, and tastes. The canonical consumer choice model predicts that β R and β F will be positive, and that β H will be negative. In each case the null hypotheses is that β = 0.
For the moment the model ignores (or subsumes in X) debit transaction fees, cash back motives, rewards incentives, and differences in acceptance. This approach is motivated by data limitations discussed below. Note however that in each case the unobserved information will bias the estimates towards acceptance of the null, if at all, since any effect is to produce revolvers who rationally do not use debit (due, e.g., to rewards incentives), or non-revolvers who rationally do use debit (due, e.g., to cash back transactions). The nature and magnitude of these potential biases are discussed in greater detail in Section 6. For now I focus on the empirical implementation of equation (2) subject to data constraints.
Data and Identification
This section details the data and identifying assumptions employed to implement equation (2), a test of the discrete effects of marginal cost on payments choice. I use data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a nationally representative crosssection of approximately 4,000 U.S. households, which contains some information on debit use and detailed data on credit card use, financial status, and household week period is only around $3.50 (assuming that the payment takes a few days to settle, and that charges are incurred smoothly over the two week period). This seems comparable to the time, hassle, and transaction costs of making an extra credit card payment per month; Brito and Hartley (1995) show that transaction costs can induce consumers to use credit cards instead lower-cost personal loans. 17 Furletti (2003) is an excellent source of information on credit card pricing and related developments.
characteristics. 18 The SCF does not contain any information on debit transaction fees, rewards incentives, or cash back usage.
Let us begin by limiting the sample to households with bankcards (H=1), and ignoring the credit constraint variable (F), for simplicity. Equation (2) then becomes:
Now Y = 1 if the household reports using a debit card and zero otherwise, 19 and R =1 if the household did not pay its most recent balance in full on any bank credit card. (I maintain the linear functional form for notational simplicity, despite the binary dependent variable.) Unfortunately, the SCF does not report balances for individual bankcards, but rather totals balances outstanding over all of the household's bankcards. This creates a downward bias on the effect of R if some households use separate bankcards for borrowing and transacting, and motivates close consideration of samples that are restricted to the 25% of households with only a single bankcard. As above, X contains households characteristics and other marginal cost variables designed to remove any unobserved correlation between debit use and revolving behavior. These covariates are detailed in Section 5.
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In some cases it will be useful to pool SCF cross-sections. The survey has been conducted every three years since 1983, and asked questions on debit use since 1992 (Table 1a shows the rapid growth of debit use among SCF households from 1992 to 2001). As the SCF lacks any panel component in the years under consideration, the pooled specifications simply add year effects T to produce:
To reiterate, standard consumer choice theory predicts that the true β R should be positive. Note the commonly told self-control story, whereby households use debit to control their credit card borrowing, implies a negative relationship between Y and R. More generally, estimating (3) or (4) using OLS (linear probability), probit, or logit will, under the usual distributional assumptions about the error term, produce the true causal effect of revolving credit card debt on debit use if there are no unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both revolving status and debit use. I therefore use the richness of SCF data to condition on several characteristics and behaviors that potentially confound interpretation of β R . Specifically:
• β R will be biased downward if R is positively correlated with latent credit demand, given that the SCF only captures a single snapshot of behavior; e.g., if a household is ramping up their credit card balances (as opposed to having reached a steady-state debt level), it will be less inclined to use debit since it is using the credit card to borrow as well as charge at the POS (i.e., not simply using the credit card as a payment device). Accordingly, I include behavioral, life-cycle, and attitudinal proxies for credit demand among the X (control) variables. These are described in Section 5. Table 1a shows two examples of how debit use does appear to vary systematically by demographics (age and education).
• β R also might be biased downward if R is correlated with transactions demand; e.g., in the absence of data on cash back transactions, we might confound revolving behavior with high transaction volume. This motivates incorporating information on income, spending, and wealth into certain specifications.
• conversely, β R will be biased upward as a test of the canonical model if consumers are indifferent (and hence randomly choose debit or credit at the POS), or if both revolving behavior and debit use are driven by some unobserved "taste for plastic". The former source of bias can be addressed by introducing additional information on wealth, along with data on credit card interest rates and line utilization that affect the marginal cost of charging and are of independent interest. The latter problem should be ameliorated by adding data on use of other electronic payments instruments to the set of covariates.
Adding measures of F, the binding credit constraint variable, to this model is then straightforward. The natural measure is based on bankcard credit line utilization. Section 5 lays out the various specifications in greater detail, but first let us turn briefly to some raw data to further motivate testing cost-based hypotheses of debit use.
Debit Use in the Raw
In this section I supplement data from the SCF with data from the December 1996 Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior (University of Michigan, 1996) . The December 1996 SOC is the only publicly available household-level nationally representative survey with data on debit usage intensity, cash back transactions, and transaction fees. The December 1996 SOC surveyed 501 households.
The raw tabulations in Table 2 cast some doubt on whether a traditional consumer choice model can fully explain debit use. Although 20% of debit users do not have a bankcard, and another 42% revolve balances, it appears that perhaps 34% of users employ debit despite the absence of any obvious cost advantage. Three measurement caveats are in order here however. The "Exclusive Cash back User" estimate of 4% is based on a very small, somewhat dated SOC sample. Moreover, revolving behavior is probably underestimated in the SOC and SCF.
21 So in these two respects the 34% "puzzle" may be overstated. On the other hand, revolving behavior in the SCF is captured merely as a snapshot, and certainly includes revolvers who still have unmet demand for consumer credit, and who therefore rationally use credit rather than debit at the POS. So in this sense the SCF measure of revolving behavior overestimates the number of households with pecuniary incentives to choose debit. On balance then this simple attempt to account for debit users appears consistent with an important role for pecuniary cost-based drivers of POS payments choice, but raises the possibility of significant nontraditional motives as well.
The rightward six columns of Table 1a show some tabulations that are closer to the spirit of the regression models developed in the previous section, as they highlight whether households facing higher marginal costs of credit card use at the POS appear more likely to use debit. In this case households without bankcards actually appear less likely to use debit than households with bankcards, counter to the prediction developed in Section 3, while revolving and high utilization households do seem more likely to use debit as predicted.
Overall, not surprisingly, the raw data are more provocative than definitive. Simple tabulations appear consistent with several different types of explanations for debit card usage, and they reinforce the intuition, developed in Section 3, that controlling for certain observable characteristics and constructing homogeneous samples will be important.
Core Results
This section presents results obtained from estimating equations (3) and (4), which are designed to identify the effect of bankcard use on regular debit card usage. The results suggest that, as predicted, both revolving a card balance and facing a binding credit limit significantly increase debit usage. Evidence on the effect of holding a bankcard is weaker, but still yields some support for the standard consumer choice model. In all, the results suggest the consumers respond strongly to the relative marginal cost of payment instruments at the POS.
Revolving
I estimate β R , the effect of revolving credit balances on debit card usage, by implementing models (3) and (4) on several samples from the SCF. 22 The key results, presented in Table 3 , suggest that revolvers are significantly more likely to use debit cards, to the tune of perhaps 6 percentage points. The base specification contains several covariates in the X vector that are designed to identify β R as a test of the canonical 21 Total credit card borrowing in the SCF falls far short of aggregate figures compiled from issuers. Comparison on the extensive margin is less definitive, but Gross and Souleles (2002) find revolving prevalence in issuer data that is consistent with substantial underreporting in the SCF. 22 Throughout the paper I report probit marginal effects with SCF sample weights; using linear probability or logit produces virtually identical results. The results are also robust to using unweighted estimation on samples that exclude wealthy households a la Hayashi and Klee (2003). consumer choice model. These variables include controls for debit card supply (census region, 23 housing type, and ATM cardholding status); and for life-cycle and transient proxies for transaction demand and secular tastes which might effect payment choice (income last year, last year's income relative to average, number of household members, homeownership status, marital status, attitudes toward borrowing for luxury items, occupation, age, gender, educational attainment, military experience, race, and 1-digit industry). 24 Appendix 2 details the covariate definitions.
The first two columns of results in Table 3 show the effects of omitting some or all of these control variables. Column 1 omits all of the X's, and simply produces a univariate correlation between debit usage and revolving behavior. Column 2 includes only those X's that plausibly are determined independently of R, namely housing type, household size, age, marital status, homeownership, race, gender, education, and income. Column 3 includes all the variables in the base specification. 25 Overall these results suggest, not surprisingly, that the covariates are critical to identification, with the base specification producing point estimates that are generally one-half the size of the raw correlation between debit use and revolving status. Importantly, the base specification appears robust to adding additional information designed to control for the particularly worrisome types of heterogeneity discussed in Section 3. Adding covariates that plausibly capture additional information on transactions demand (including functions of wealth, and of the level of spending relative to income) tends to reduce the point estimates slightly but not significantly (results not shown). Adding covariates that might be correlated with a "taste for plastic", including usage of other electronic payments and/or computer banking, does not change the results either (not shown).
Reading down rows in Table 3 , the estimation samples include the individual SCF cross-sections from 1995, 1998, and 2001, as well as the three samples pooled together.
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This strategy is motivated by the rapid growth in debit usage over time, as Table 1a indicates. Comparing results across the three sample years individually suggests stability in the relationship between revolving any credit card debt and debit use from 1998 to 2001, but not between 1995 and the other two survey years. Estimates using the base specification on the 1995 cross-section are substantially smaller, and insignificant. Table 3 also exhibits the effects of limiting the sample based on cardholding and charging behavior. These cuts are motivated by the measurement issues discussed in Section 3, but in fact leave the results unchanged in most cases. The results are also robust to other alternative measures of revolving behavior (not shown), including using 23 Census region is not available in the 2001 SCF public release; results estimated on the 1995 and 1998 do not change if region is omitted. 24 Results do not change if one-digit occupation code is used instead of, or in addition to, industry. 25 Appendix 3 displays the correlations between debit usage and the control variables from a regression using this specification on the 1995-2001 pooled sample. 26 I omit the 1992 data because the question on debit lacks the later emphasis on regular usage (see Appendix 1). Adding 1992 data to the pooled sample tends to reduce the point estimates slightly. I omit households lacking a checking account (14% of households) or with nonpositive income (0.7% of households). Including these households does not change the results. total credit card balances or self-reported habitual revolving behavior to define R instead of the most recent bankcard revolving balance. Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of bankcard holding on debit use. Except for the 1995 sample one finds the expected effect that cardholding reduces debit use, ceteris paribus, but the results are imprecisely estimated. The second column of Table 4 shows that adding bankcard holding, H, to the base specification including R does not change the effect of revolving status (compare this column to column 1, which replicates the base covariate specification estimated on the cardholding sample in Table 3 ). This regression is estimated on the "full" SCF, which excludes only those households without a checking account or nonpositive income. The third column presents the estimates of β H from the same regression. The fourth column includes only H as the regressor of interest, and excludes revolvers from the sample in order maximize sample homogeneity (by including only those households without bankcard debt). Overall the effect of H is often large--with reductions in debit use of up to 7.5 percentage points-but significant only in the 1998 sample. 27 The data thus preclude drawing firm conclusions as to whether bankcard holding actually reduces debit use. Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of binding credit constraints on debit use. The first panel presents results from a regression where revolvers are divided into three utilization categories based on the ratio of their most recent bankcard balances to their credit limit, with non-revolvers as the omitted category. 28 As predicted in Section 3, the most intense credit card borrowers--the 7% of the sample with utilization rates of 75% or greater--appear discretely and significantly more likely to use debit than the least intense revolvers. 29 The result holds in every sample but the 1995 cross-section.
Additional results suggest that future credit constraints may be as important as current ones in driving debit use. If only current credit constraints matter, than we would expect discrete jumps in debit use only at the bottom and top of the utilization distribution. The jumps capture the revolving and credit limit effects, respectively. But if the anticipation of future credit constraints matters, we might find that the credit limit begins to bind at utilization levels substantially below 100%, if consumers hold buffer stocks of available credit. The latter case appears to hold. Whether one demarcates line usage as in panel one, or by conditional terciles (producing much lower cutoffs for medium and high intensity, shown in panel two), it appears that debit usage jumps discretely and 27 The power problem could stem in part from biases. Attenuation bias could result since cardholding mechanically effects revolving behavior (this type of econometric problem is discussed in Angrist and Krueger 1999 ). An unobserved self-control motive would also attenuate β H , if consumers somehow use debit to avoid over-charging while holding bankcards. (On the other hand, β H will be strengthened if consumers don't take bankcards due to self-control concerns.) 28 I use total bankcard balances and the credit limit variable (x414) in constructing the utilization measures; using total credit card balances instead has little impact on the results. 29 Gross and Souleles (2002) use utilization categories of 0-50%, 50-90%, and >90% in their analysis of the impact of credit constraints on interest rate elasticities and propensities to consume out of available credit. This demarcation is impractical in my sample since only 3% of households have utilization >90%. Presumably this low proportion is due to: a) underreporting of credit card borrowing, and b) the fact that the SCF credit line variable may include lines from multiple cards.
significantly for medium but not high intensity users. 30 Panel three explores this further by dividing revolvers based on conditional quartiles of line utilization, and finds again that the second discrete jump in debit use seems to occur somewhere in the middle of the utilization distribution. Finally, it also appears that households reporting no emergency access to capital from family or friends are much more likely to use debit at lower utilization levels, although none of the differences by this proxy for buffer liquidity are statistically significant. Table 6 displays evidence suggesting that the utilization and revolving effects on debit use operate through reductions in bankcard charges, as one would expect. Mechanically, that is, one expects to find revolvers charging less on their bankcard if they are in fact minimizing the marginal cost of POS payments by not borrowing-to-charge. This appears to be true, resoundingly, regardless of how one measures revolving behavior.
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The table presents results only from the 2001 and pooled samples for brevity's sake, and in both samples one finds large reductions in the level of bankcard charges for revolvers relative to non-revolvers. The $428 and $344 reductions in the 2001 and pooled samples (column 1), respectively, each amount to 60% of the sample mean; estimating mean charges using tobit instead of OLS, or estimating median charges using least-absolutedeviations, produces equal or greater proportional reductions (not shown). Debit users do not exhibit significantly greater reductions than non-users, however, suggesting that some revolvers may switch to cash or check rather debit to manage their payments costs. This makes sense if, as hinted earlier, credit may actually dominate debit as a medium of exchange along certain dimensions (e.g., fraud protection, acceptance), a possibility discussed further in Section 6. Another possibility, suggested weakly by the point estimates on the utilization variables, is that there is some fixed cost of adopting debit use.
Overall, the evidence on the effect of revolving, utilization, and (to a lesser extent) bankcard holding suggests that consumers respond strongly to discrete differences in the marginal cost of payments alternatives at the POS. The findings are less conclusive on the impacts of smaller cost differences. Specifically, a higher interest rate on bankcard balances makes it more expensive to borrow-to-charge, all else equal; accordingly, we might then expect to find debit use increasing in this rate for revolvers. The data produce point estimates (not shown) that are generally "right-signed", but small and imprecisely estimated; e.g., in the pooled sample, the probability of debit usage appears to increase by .09 percentage points (0.2%) for every 100 basis point increase in the interest rate for revolvers (but not for non-revolvers), with a t-statistic of only 0.43. Some of the imprecision may be due to the fact that we observe only the household's current rate on 30 The finding here seems analogous to the discrete jump in the propensity to consume out of available credit among medium intensity users found in Gross and Souleles (2002) . 31 A data limitation in the SCF motivates experimentation with the alternative measures of R presented in the second and third columns of results in table 6. The problem is that the SCF only captures the previous month's charges, and presumably some fraction of households started revolving only after choosing not to pay the previous month's balance in full. For this fraction one would not necessarily expect to observe lower charges in the previous month. Accordingly, the regressions presented in column 2 define revolvers as those who are currently revolving a balance and report habitually revolving a balance; column 3 regressions take the more extreme step of excluding current-but-not-habitual revolvers from the sample. the card with the largest balance. Given the prevalence of teaser rates, for example, we might underestimate the effect of credit card interest rates on regular debit use if the observed interest rate understates the typical rate. As such I replicate the analysis on the 78% of households reporting interest rates greater than 9.99%, and find that the estimated point estimate in the pooled sample does increase twofold (but with a t-statistic of only 0.53).
In all, the standard errors and measurement limitations do not rule out large effects on the intensive rate margin. The confidence intervals allow for debit usage increases of up to 0.9 percentage points per 100 basis point increase in the bankcard interest rate. This would imply a substantial price response, given the base probability of debit use (40%) and the observed spread of interest rates (1 st percentile = 1.99%, 99 th percentile = 23.9%). Transaction-level data could be used to estimate this effect more precisely in future research (see Section 7).
Summarizing the key results presented in this section, it appears that households do in fact respond strongly to discrete changes in the marginal cost of payments at the POS. This is evidenced by the significant effects on debit use of revolving status and credit limit constraints in particular. Pecuniary marginal cost minimization accounts for a roughly estimated 25% of cross-sectional debit use--if we simply sum the absolute values of β R and β H in the base pooled sample, and scale by proportion of debit-using households. The next section refines and interprets this estimate by considering measurement issues and the null hypothesis in greater detail.
Measurement Error and Interpretation
This section refines interpretation of the paper's core results by exploring how measurement error might impact the key estimates presented in Section 5. In particular, seven different measurement issues could bias β R downward and thereby understate the role of canonical consumer choice in driving debit use. The discussion below draws on regression results presented in Table 7 . Appendix 4 contains more detail on related variable construction and estimation procedures.
Mismeasurement of R, revolving behavior.
Section 5 considered alternative definitions of R based on different reported measures of credit card borrowing. A deeper problem is that the reports themselves may systematically understate revolving prevalence (see footnote 21). I address this "misclassification" problem in two ways. The first approach exploits SCF interviewer observations on the quality of a household's responses. Limiting the sample to those most likely to respond truthfully (Table 7 , column A) and accurately (column B) increases the estimated effect of revolving on debit use by up to 4 percentage points, but not significantly so. The second method implements the (Mahajan 2004 ) corrections for misclassification error in binary regressors, using my habitual measure of revolving as the true R of interest, and the behavioral measure of bankcard revolving as the instrument. If we assume that misclassification in R is independent of the covariates, then β R rises to [] in the base specification; more realistically, allowing the misclassification to vary with race, income, and education increases β R to [a precisely estimated ] . Overall then it appears that misclassification of R [does/not] significantly attenuate estimates of β R .
Omitted strategic default motives. β R might also understate the extent of rational cost minimization if the model fails to capture strategic default. In particular, a revolver who is contemplating bankruptcy, or simply not making interest payments, might rationally elect to continue borrowing-to-charge rather than using debit.
32 Accordingly, I use SCF credit scores to re-estimate the base specification on a sample of high-risk borrowers. Column A shows that the point estimate in the high-risk pooled sample increases slightly; this result is driven by stability in the 1995 and 1998 estimates, as the 2001 point estimate (column B) increases sharply. Alternately, conditioning on functions of the credit score in the pooled base sample reduces the point estimate by about 2 to 2.5 percentage points but also leaves the qualitative results unchanged. Overall then there is little to suggest that omitted strategic default motives dramatically impact the results.
"Cash back" motives for debit use. The ability to get cash back at the POS via an online debit transaction makes debit use attractive by eliminating a separate trip to the ATM (which consumes time, and may require a transaction fee). Practically, the absence of data on cash back usage in the SCF confounds interpreting β R as a test of the canonical consumer choice model because some proportion C of non-revolvers should use debit regularly (and exclusively) to obtain cash back. I explore the magnitude of this bias via a simulation that randomly assigns an "exclusive cash back" motive to non-revolving debit users in the SCF. Raw data suggests that C is low--calculating it directly in the SOC yields 7%. This is not surprising in light of other data showing that cash back transactions are relatively infrequent, and that relatively few debit users initiate them (only 18% in the April/May 1999 PSI Global Survey, 29% in the 1996 SOC). As such I conduct simulations allowing for weak and strong exclusive cash back motives, where C = 7% and C = 40%, respectively. β R rises to 0.079 in the former case (column A), and to 0.158 in the latter case (column B). Thus it appears that unobserved cash back motives could produce substantial downward bias on the estimate of consumer responsiveness to the marginal cost of payments.
Fraud costs/security precaution. Credit cards offered superior fraud protection during the sample period studied in the paper (Financial 2002 ). As such, some revolvers might rationally borrow-to-charge rather than using debit, if the expected fraud loss on a marginal transaction exceeds the expected marginal finance charge. But adding the SCF's categorical measures of appetite for financial risk as additional covariates leaves β R unchanged. The SCF variable is likely to be an imperfect proxy for expected fraud loss, however, so I tap market research on preferences for online debit to help develop a rough idea of the extent to which unobserved security concerns might influence estimates of β R . The STAR 2000 Consumer Awareness, Trial and Usage Study found that 51% of debit users preferred online debit, among whom 54% cited better security (due to the PIN requirement) as the primary reason for their preference. Accordingly, let us assume that (.51*.54) = 27.5% of debit users will use only online debit; given the relative scarcity of PIN terminals (compared to offline facilities), this implies that debit is an unobservably poor substitute for credit for these consumers. I simulate the effect this might have on β R by randomly assigning a "security precaution" motive to a proportion S of revolvers who do not use debit, taking 27.5% as the strong case, and an arbitrary 5% as the weak case.
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β R rises to 0.085 in the weak case (column A) and to 0.134 in the strong case (column B). Overall, it seems that unobserved security precautions might lead to some attenuation of β R .
Rewards incentives favoring credit use. Credit cards typically offer more generous "rewards" (e.g., frequent flier points, cash back, etc.) than debit. 34 The marginal benefit of these rewards might exceed the marginal cost of borrowing-to-charge for many consumers, implying that any unobserved net benefit could bias estimates of true price sensitivity downward. Assume then that some fraction Z of revolvers prefer to borrowto-charge, rather than use debit, in order to obtain rewards. I simulate a "strong" version of the rewards motive by setting Z to 60%, in light of recent survey evidence that "rewards dominate the reasons to use a specific card for 6 in 10 Americans". 35 The "weak" version is motivated by the roughly 20% of SCF households who report credit card interest rates of less than 10%. The latter case produces a β R of 0.115, with the former yielding a huge increase to 0.274. In all it seems likely that omitted information on rewards usage leads to substantial downward bias on the core estimates of consumer sensitivity to the marginal cost of payments.
Multiple bankcards-as discussed earlier, the SCF captures total bankcard balances across all bankcards. R therefore must be derived from this aggregate measure, whereas a true test of a canonical consumer choice model would require information on whether the consumer has the ability to "float" on any single bankcard. The most direct test of the degree to which this biases β R is to limit the sample to households holding a single bankcard (Table 3) ; however, this approach invites sample composition effects. Alternatively, one could make assumptions on the degree to which those appearing to borrow-to-charge in the data are in fact rationally floating. The rewards and security simulations, which also treat revolvers who do not use debit, give a sense as to how large the bias could be.
Debit card supply and merchant acceptance. Although debit is available and accepted widely today--as 80% of ATM cards sport the offline Visa logo alone (Consulting 2002) , and as PIN terminals steadily increase in prevalence-this was much less true in 1995. 33 Note that this strong case is almost certainly too extreme, since presumably many consumers who refuse to use offline debit still use online debit regularly and the outcome of interest is a binary measure of regular debit use. 34 Despite widely publicized new programs on the debit side, the STAR 2002 Annual Consumer Survey found that only about 6% of consumers get ATM or debit rewards (c.f. Marlin 2003) . In contrast, credit card incentives have been prevalent for years. The December 1996 SOC found that 56% of credit card holders had a card with rewards. 35 Quoted from summary of Edgar, Dunn, and Company's PaymentDynamics 2004 Preferred Card Study at http://www.edgardunn.com/uploads/PaymentDynamicsOverview.pdf .
Practically, this implies the during the early part of the sample period under consideration in this paper, there were nonusers who would have used debit given the right supply conditions. If some of these consumers instead borrowed-to-charge, then our estimate of marginal cost sensitivity would again be biased downwards. This effect probably helps explain why β R is so much lower in 1995 than in later years.
Overall then, it seems plausible that data limitations significantly dampen β R , the observed effect of revolving on debit use. 36 Better data on cash back, rewards, and individual card balances would be particularly useful for generating more accurate estimates of the importance of marginal cost, traditionally defined, on debit use.
Conclusion
I close by summarizing evidence on the predictive power of alternative consumer choice models in the market for retail payments, and by discussing related implications. The results presented in this paper suggest that consumers respond strongly to the relative cost of payments at the point-of-sale, with the core findings implying that canonical cost minimization can explain perhaps 25% of regular debit use. Adjustments for measurement error and other biases admit the possibility of much larger "true" point estimates.
These results have at least two implications for the evolution of the retail payments industry and related policy issues. First, they suggest that debit and credit are substitutes, and thus cast doubt on the widespread notion that debit's growth has come largely at the expense of cash and checks (Reosti 2000) . Second, they imply that the adoption of general purpose stored-value cards will likely depend not only on network effects and safety/convenience advantages relative to paper-based media, but also on the marginal cost faced by the consumer relative to credit and debit. 37 For example, if, in equilibrium, the pecuniary transaction cost for stored-value proves less than for debit (due, e.g., to lower verification costs), then stored-value will become a viable way for revolvers to avoid borrowing-to-charge.
Clearly, however, the data do not rule out less traditional explanations for debit card use and payments choice generally. The point estimates, confidence intervals, and raw household data each leave room for a large residual number of debit users who are not motivated by canonical marginal cost minimization. Moreover, other raw data appear consistent with particular behavioral explanations for debit use. The aforementioned fact that average debit transaction size is significantly smaller than that for credit seems puzzling in the presence of fixed transaction fees for debit, but might square with mental 36 Note that missing information on the prevalence of debit transaction fees is not likely to bias estimates on β R , since fees are: 1. not very prevalent (see Section 3); and 2. typically charged only on online debit transactions. As such fees are unlikely to influence the extensive margin of debit use, all else constant, since in most cases consumers will have the option of a fee-free offline transaction. 37 Santomero and Seater (1996) , motivated in large part by prepaid cards, model a consumer choosing among several media of exchange.
accounting (Thaler 1985) . More specifically, market research suggests that debit helps many households "control spending" (Financial 2001) , suggesting a "pain of paying" (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998) relative to credit that might be optimal for sophisticated consumers with self-control problems.
The market for retail payments is thus a fertile ground for refining and testing models of high-frequency intertemporal consumer choice. Each cell presents the proportion of U.S. households in a given SCF (sub-)sample that report using debit, and the number of households in the sample under consideration. Proportions obtained by weighting SCF means by variable x42001. The "screened sample" includes only households with a checking account and positive income. "Not revolving" sample includes bankcard holders only. High utilization is defined as revolving bankcard balances greater than 75% of available credit limit. Sub-samples may not aggregate exactly to full samples due to rounding (recall that the unit of observation in the SCF is an implicate, not a household). Bankcard variables from 2001 SCF. "Revolves bankcard balances" is constructed based on whether the household is currently revolving; the percentage of debit-using households accounted for by revolvers rises to 46% if ones adds households that are not currently revolving but report typically doing so. "Exclusive cash back user" is based on the December 1996 SOC, and captures households that report using debit only for transactions involving cash back (total debit transactions per month equal to cash back debit transactions per month), have a credit card, but don't typically revolve balances. Each cell shows the probit marginal effects coefficient and standard error on R, as well as the regression sample size, from estimating a version of equation (3) or (4) on SCF data. Debit use is the dependent variable, and point estimates can be multiplied by 100 to translate the magnitudes into percentage point terms. All standard errors are calculated using the imputation correction provided in the SCF codebook. Covariate specifications are described in Section 5 of the text. All samples exclude households without a checking account or with nonpositive income. The "base" sample includes only bank credit card holders; regressions featured in the last column assign R=1 only to those households that compiled no bankcard charges on their most recent statement and exclude other revolvers from the sample. Each cell shows the probit marginal effects coefficient and standard error for the variable listed in the column heading, as well as the regression sample size, from estimating a version of equation (3) or (4) on SCF data. Debit use is the dependent variable, and point estimates can be multiplied by 100 to translate the magnitudes into percentage point terms. All standard errors are calculated using the imputation correction provided in the SCF codebook. All regressions here include the "base" covariate specification described in Section 5 of the text. The "base" sample includes only bank credit card holders (and the first column of results here therefore replicates the Table 3 base covariate specification results for reference). The two "full" sample columns present results on R (the revolving dummy) and H (the bankcardholding dummy) from the same regression (reading across any row), on a sample that includes both cardholders and noncardholders and excludes only those without a checking account or nonpositive income. The final column includes only nonrevolvers in the sample and hence omits the variable R from the regression. Each cell presents the probit marginal effects coefficient and standard error on the bankcard credit limit utilization variable listed in the column heading, for a regression on a sample of bankcard holders with checking accounts and positive income from the SCF survey year listed in the row heading. Debit use is the dependent variable, and point estimates can be multiplied by 100 to translate the magnitudes into percentage point terms. Households with zero utilization (nonrevolvers) comprise the omitted category. Each regression contains the base specification covariates described earlier. Each panel presents results for a different demarcation of utilization categories, as motivated in the text. Emergency funds variable is taken from SCF variable x6443, "In an emergency could you or your (spouse/partner) get financial assistance of $3,000 or more from any friends or relatives who do not live with you?", which first appeared in the 2001 SCF. Each cell presents the coefficient and standard error on a measure of revolving behavior R, from a weighted OLS regression of level bankcard charges in the previous month on R and the usual ("base") set of covariates. Bankcard charges are measured in 2001 dollars and censored at the 99 th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers. All definitions of R start with the standard 1/0 variable for whether the household revolved bankcard balances after their most recent statement (Column 1). Column 2 modifies this definition by only counting those who are both currently revolving and report habitually revolving as R==1; column 3 modifies it by excluding current revolvers who do not report habitual revolving from the sample. The final three columns present results from a single regression (reading across any row), with utilization measured by conditional terciles and non-revolvers (standard definition) serving as the omitted category. Each cell presents the probit marginal effects coefficient and standard error on R, for a regression described in the row title, using the base covariate specification described earlier. As in tables 3-5, debit use is the dependent variable and one can multiple the point estimates by 100 to translate the magnitudes into percentage point terms. Please see Appendix 4 for additional details on sample restrictions, variable construction, and estimation procedures. Estimates are based on the pooled sample of bankcard holders unless noted otherwise.
Interviewer observation regressions limit the sample to those who report "truthfully" (column A), and both "truthfully" and "accurately" (column B).
The Mahajan correction regressions are done two ways: first, assuming misclassification of R to be independent of other covariates (column A); second, allowing the misclassification to vary with other covariates (column B)-specifically race, education, and income.
Strategic bankruptcy regressions are estimated on a sample of "high-risk" borrowers only, using the pooled sample (column A) and 2001 sample (column B).
Cash back motive regressions simulate the impact of an "exclusive cash back" motive assigned to 7% (column A) and 40% (column B) of non-revolving debit users.
Security precaution regressions simulate the impact of a fraud risk motive that leads consumers to prefer online debit and credit card transactions over offline debit, and hence to borrow-to-charge due to the relative scarcity of PIN terminals. Columns A and B explore cases where 10% and 27.5% of revolvers who do not use debit are assumed to have this preference, respectively.
Rewards motive regressions simulate the impact of borrow-to-charge motive arising from rewards that produce marginal benefits exceeding the marginal financing cost. Reported accurately (interviewer observation) please see Appendix 4
Appetite for financial risk x3014
Sample weight x42001 * I use bankcard balances rather than total credit card balances in the numerator of the utilization variable in part for conceptual reasons, and in part because a) the credit limit variable (x414) is always >0 for those with bankcards (but sometimes zero for those with other credit cards but no bankcard), and b) total credit card balances exceed the credit limit variable far more frequently than bankcard balances do. ** gen computerbank=0; for var x6600 x6601 x6602 x6603 x6604 x6605 x6606 x6607 x6870 x6871 x6872 x6873 x6608 x6609 x6610 x6611 x6612 x6613 x6614 x6615 x6874 x6875 x6876 x6877 x6616 x6617 x6618 x6619 x6620 x6621 x6622 x6623 x6878 x6879 x6880 x6881 x6624 x6625 x6626 x6627 x6628 x6629 x6630 x6631 x6882 x6883 x6884 x6885 x6632 x6633 x6634 x6635 x6636 x6637 x6638 x6639 x6886 x6887 x6888 x6889 x6640 x6641 x6642 x6643 x6644 x6645 x6646 x6647 x6890 x6891 x6892 x6893: replace computerbank=1 if X==12 This table shows the probit marginal effects on each covariate included in the base covariate specification estimated on the base SCF pooled sample. Please see Appendix 2 for detailed variable definitions. The omitted industry category is manufacturing. The "FIRE" industry category also includes "business & repair services". The "transport" industry category also includes communications, utilities, personal services, entertainment and recreational services, and professional & related services. Industry dummies are jointly significant, household size dummies are not jointly significant.
